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51

STATm·1ENT OF THE CASI:

In 1978, the Public Service Commission ("the Commission"),
as a part of the original "Wexpro" hearing, concluded in its 1978
Order that because certain properties, which were primarily oil
producing, were not "used and useful" in the gas utility business,
they were not "utility property" and therefore no jurisdiction
existed in the Commission to examine the terms of Mountain Fuel
Supply Company's {"MFS") proposed transfer of such properties to
Wexpro Company {"Wexpro").

The Division of Public Utilities ("the

Division") and the Committee of Consumer Services ("the Committee")
appealed that Order to this Court, asserting legal error in that
jurisdictional holding.
In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service
Commission, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979)

(hereafter "the Wexpro Case"),

this Court rejected the classification of properties as utility or
non-utility based on whether the properties primarily produced gas
·or oil and remanded the case to the Commission to examine the
proposed transfer of properties using a proper and specified
jurisdiction test.

595 P.2d at 878.

The Appeal in the Wexpro Case

did not raise, and thus the Court's opinion did not decide, numerous
questions concerning the proper sharing of benefits from the oil and
gas properties owned by MFS and its affiliates or the power of the
Commission to force MFS to conduct a ratepayer supported exploration
program.

-2-
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Taking this Court's decision in the Wexpro Case as
direction and guidance, the Division and the committee negotiated
with MFS and Wexpro to settle the property transfer issues dividing
the parties.

The resulting Stipulation ("the Stipulation") and

Agreement ("the Agreement"} assumed that all of the affected
properties were utility properties based on this Court's
definitions.

(Hereafter, the Stipulation and the Agreement may be

collectively referred to as "the Settlement".)
On August 3, 1981, MFS, Wexpro, the Division and the
Committee presented the Commission with a summary of the Stipulation
and Agreement, and their motion for approval of, the Settlement.
The Commission set the matter for hearing on October 14, 1981, at
which time the Utility Shareholders' Association ("Shareholders")
and the Coalition of Senior Citizens ("the Coalition") entered_ their
appearances.

The proponents of the Settlement presented evidence

r

and argument during the course of hearings held on October 14, 15,

!

16, 19 and 20, 1981, and November 23, 24 and 25, 1981.

Prior notice

of the hearings and the opportunity for the public to participate
was published in a newspaper of statewide distribution for two
~

consecutive days.

·~(hearings

The news media provided extensive coverage of the

and of the opportunity for public comment.

(Ord. at 4

and 5.)
After considering the extensive expert testimony, public
:I~

comment, and argqment and explanations by counsel, the Commission
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issued its Report and Order on December 31, l98i, approving the
Settlement.

On January 18, 1982, the Shareholders made application

for rehearing.

The Coalition and Utah Department of Administrative

Services ("Administrative Services") also filed applications for
rehearing dated January 20, 1982.

All applications were denied by

the Commission on February 9, 1982.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Committee and Division believe that the voluminous
pages of "questions" presented for review by Appellants can fairly
be

reduc~d

to the following:
1.

Could The Wexpro Litigation Be Settled?

2.

Does The Settlement Comply With The Law As Declared

by This Court?
3.

Did The Commission Surrender Its Statutory

Jurisdiction By Approving The Settlement?
4.

Does The Order Clearly Express The Commission's

Intent As To Its Finality?

SUMMARY OF DIVISION AND COMMITTEE POSITION
Based on the clear power given it by statute and the clear
legislative purpose of encouraging settlement of controversies, the
Commission acted lawfully and properly in approving the Settlement.
Based on the overwhelming and unanimous expert testimony below, the

-4-
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Settlement was in the public interest and its terms complied with
the law as declared by this Court in its Wexpro decision.

In

essence, the Settlement resolves the dispute between MFS and its
ratepayers by the mechanism of selling the ratepayers' interest in
the disputed properties to the shareholders in exchange for a
retained interest in the oil and gas produced from the properties.
While this solution results in the properties being transferred out
of MFS's utility accounts and thus presumptively out of the
Commission's jurisdiction, it does not affect the statutory scope of
the Commission.

By submitting the Settlement to the Commission for

approval and a determination that the transfers are in the public
interest and for fair market value, the parties recognized the
Commission's authority to regulate the terms of such transfers.

:i

Finally, as made eminently clear by the Commission's language in its
Conclusion of Law #6, the Order was intended to be final as to those
properties treated by the Settlement.
In short, no grounds exist for criticizing the Commission
Order approving the Settlement; rather, the Commission's action
should not only be upheld on appeal but applauded as a responsible
and considered step to resolve a veritable Pandora's Box of
-litigation.
~
~

~
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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND
The Brief of MFS and Wexpro contains a satisfactory outline

of the testimony presented at the hearing below.

The Division and

the Committee hereby adopt that discussion and incorporate it by
this reference.
The material found at pages 16 - 29 and at pages 38 - 45 of
Administrative Services Brief provides a largely irrelevant but
adequate summary of the history of the Wexpro controversy and what
the Division and the Committee would have argued had there been no
Settlement.

Because this material may be useful background to the

Court, it is hereby incorporated by this reference with the caution
that it does not address the issues before this Court on appeal, to
wit:

whether the Commission's Order approving the Agreement is

supported by law and the factual record made during the Commission's
hearings on the Settlement.
B.

INACCURACIES IN APPELLANTS' FACTUAL STATEMENTS
The Administrative Services' and the Coalition's statement

of the terms of the Settlement is so colored with argument that the
Division and the Committee find it necessary to provide its own outline of the Settlement.

First, however, the Division and Committee

must correct certain misstatements and erroneous conclusions
contained in the Briefs of Administrative Services and the Coalition:

-6-
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Inaccuracy #1:

"There Was No Determination Below of the
Public Interest."

(Admin. Serv. Br. at 1)

For eight days, the Commission heard testimony and
argument on whether the terms of the Settlement were in the public
interest.

The Commission explicitly found that the Settlement was

in the public interest.

(Order at Findings of Fact #8, #9, and #11;

Conclusions of Law #4 and #5)
Inaccuracy #2:

s

"The Commission Took No Evidence and Made
No Finding as to the Fair Market Value of the
Properties Transferred Under the Agreement."
(Admin. Serv. Br. at 1)

The record below is replete with expert testimony from
highly respected oil and gas experts that the Agreement passed to
1

the ratepayers, fair market value consideration for the ratepayers'
interest in properties transferred under the Agreement.

(Tr. 1024,

1025, 1045, 1155-56, 1165, 1173, 1249, 1251, 1261, 1263, 1328, 1353,
1487 and 1711.)

Based upon this unambiguous record, the Commission·

·specifically found that fair market value consideration had been
passed in the transfers effectuated by the Agreement.

(Order at

Findings of Fact #10 and #11; Conclusion of Law #5).
Inaccuracy #3:

"It was the Division's Position That All
Profits From Oil 0perations Were to Reduce
Natural Gas Prices."

Nei~her in the wexpro Case

(Admin. Serv. Br. at 7)
(Case No. 15835) nor in the

1977 hearings before the Commission has the Division argued that all

-7-
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MfS oil profits should reduce natural gas rates.

(See Tr. 674-75,

707, 743-44; Joint Brief of Petitioners in Case No. 15835 at 85
{1978)).

1

It was always the law, as well as the understanding of

the Division and the Committee, that a portion of the oil profits
would be retained by the shareholders to compensate for that risk of
development assumed by the shareholders and to provide a return on
the shareholder capital investment in the properties.

This Court

did not, in its Wexpro opinion, dictate how the oil profits would be
divided between the shareholders and the ratepayers, leaving that
issue to the expert discretion of the Commission.
Inaccuracy #4:

"The Division Gave Up Its Right to Represe.nt
the Public Interest Before the Commission."
{Admin. Serv. Br. at 10)

Although this is not a factual issue, and hence will be
dealt with, infra at Section C, no place in the Stipulation or the
Agreement does the Division waive any right it might have to contest
MFS's or Wexpro's performance under the Stipulation or the Agreement
or to contest any other action or non-action by these entities as it
relates to their operations under the jurisdiction of the Commission.
If anything, the Agreement and Stipulation expand the power of the

!The cited transcripts indicate that Mr. Berman (with whom
Administrative Services' counsel was associated at the time) expressly
represented that the Division did not advocate that all of the oil
profits should be utilized to reduce gas rates.

-8-
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Division, because it will monitor and contest matters thereunder
which it otherwise legally believes are non-utility in nature.
Inaccurracy #5:

"The Commission Failed to Hold a Hearing as
Ordered by This Court."

(Admin. Serv. Br. at 11)

This Court ordered as part of the Wexpro Case that the
Commission hold a hearing to determine whether any of the oil
properties proposed to be transferred to Wexpro were utility
properties and thus subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
Because the Settlement implicitly assumes all properties transferred
were "utility properties", the "hearing" yearned for by
Administrative Services was unnecessary.

The Court should note that

for eight days in October, November and December, 1981, the
Commissi'on took testimony from factual, expert, and public witnesses
for the express purpose of determining whether the Settlement was in
harmony with this Court's opinion in the Wexpro Case.
Conclusions of Law #1; Tr. 931, 932-33.)

(Order at

The nearly one thousand

pages of transcript in the designated record on appeal bear strong
testimony that indeed an appropriate hearing resulted from this
Court's remand.
Inaccuracy #6:

"MFS's Exploration Program Ended When the
Settlement was Approved."

(Admin. Serv. Br. at 12)

The MFS exploration program ended when MFS terminated
the Joint Exploration Agreement in 1980.

MPS.thereafter gave notice

of its intention not to acquire additional unexplored acreage into

-9-
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MF3 utility accounts for future exploration, and to cease
developmental and exploratory drilling on all leases then in MFS.
Far from stopping an ongoing drilling program, the Settlement
ensures that an energetic exploration and development drilling
program will continue to exist to the
this state.

b~nefit

of the ratepayers of

{Tr. 1018, 1019, 1023, 1030, 1143, 1158, 1226, 1232,

1244, 1252, 1272, 1273, 1280, 1320, 1398, 1485, 1688.)
C.

LITIGATION RESOLVED BY THE SETTLEMENT
During the pendency of Case No. 76-057-14

(the Wexpro

Case), MFS received general rate increases in Case Nos. 77-057-03,
79-057-03, 80-057-01 and 81-057-01.

The Orders establishing the

overall increase in rates entered in each of those cases has been in
some way connected to the outcome of the Wexpro Case.
Wexpro issues were raised by the Wyoming Public Service
Commission in Docket No. 9192 Sub 68 in 1980 and 1981. 2.
In 1980, MFS, Wexpro, Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc.
(Resources)

3

and Celsius Energy Company (Celsius) filed

Applications with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in

2The Settlement attempts to deal with all issues for both
Utah and Wyoming. The Wyoming Public Service Commission approved
the Settlement, and its Order has now become final and unappealable
by the passage of time.
3Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc. and Celsius Energy Company are
subsidiaries of M9untain Fuel Supply Company.

-10-
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FERC Docket Nos. CP80-274, CPB0-275 and CIB0-233 seeking

authorization for the transfer of the properties subject to the
Agreement from MFS and Wexpro to Celsius, a subsidiary of Entrada
Industries, a subsidiary of MFS.

Resolution of these Applications

in favor of MFS, absent the Settlement, could have resulted in the
end of cost-of-service gas in Utah.

Mid-Louisiana Gas co. v.

F.E.R.C., 664 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1981).
Also in 1980, MFS, Wexpro and certain shareholders of MFS
filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah in Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service
Commission of Utah, Civil No. C-80-0710J. The Complaints, as
amended and supplemented, claimed that the regulation of MFS
properties by the Commission violated various provisions of the
Constitution of the United States.

The District Court entered an

Order dismissing the Complaint, but without prejudice to refiling
after the Commission and this Court had acted.
In 1981, MFS attempted to transfer properties to Celsius
without FERC or Corn.mission approval.

Upon challenge of these

transfers by the Division and the Committee, a preliminary
restraining order issued from the Commission pending further
hearings on the propriety of the proposed transfers.

This

litigation was designated Case No. 81-057-04.
The FERC, Commission, Wyoming PSC, and federal court
litigation as well as the remand case and rate cases here on appeal

-11-
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were part of a protracted, time-consuming, expensive and disruptive
battle which has cost the people of Utah over Four Million Dollars

($4,000,000.00) in legal fees alone since January 1, 1977.
(Tr. 940, 1149, 1480).
D.

THE SETTLEMENT
The Court has before it in the designated record the full

Agreement and the Stipulation which attempts to put to rest all of
the litigation described above.

It should be understood that the

Settlement attempts to resolve many points of controversy which
were not before this Court in the Wexpro Case.

Because of the

scope of the lrtigation which the Settlement seeks to resolve and
the somewhat arcane nature of the oil and gas business, the
Stipulation and Agreement are not light reading.

Consequently, the

Division and the Committee provides below what they hope and
believe is a fair and readable summary of the most significant
aspects of the Settlement.
1•

.
Gas Reservoirs.
.
4
Pro d uct1ve

The depreciated book investment in currently gas-producing
leases, wells and appurtenant facilities

(which primarily produce

4Administrative Services and the Coalition attempt to find
an "issue" when they accuse the Settlement of partaking of the
"discredited MFS classification system." While for clarity and
precision reservoirs were classified as "gas" or "oil" in the
Settlement, that classification served no jurisdictional purpose
and hence is not violative of the Wexpro Case.

-12-
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cost-of-service natural gas, together with some natural gas liquids
and oil) have historically been accounted for in the MFS rate-base
account 101, upon which MFS earned a rate of return. 5

All

investment and ownership of these wells and appurtenant facilities,
and the rights to production from these wells (but not the leases)
will be retained by MFS.

All natural gas, natural gas liquids and

oil produced from these reservoirs will belong to the utility and
regulated by the Commission.

Wexpro will operate these wells and

facilities on a service contract basis, but will make no profit for
that service.

The terms of the service contract were approved by

the Commission as part of the Settlement.
Because many of these reservoirs are not perforated by a
sufficient number of wells to adequately produce all available gas,
future developmental drilling will be required.

The Agreement

requires Wexpro to perform all necessary developmental drilling at
its sole risk and expense, and specifically requires Wexpro to
expend a minimum of Forty Million Dollars ($40,000,000) within the
first five

(5) years of the Agreement's· term for developmental

5These wells and the reservoirs from which they produce,
along with any appurtenant facilities, are to be distinguished
from the lease which, for any particular surface area, governs
legal rights to all strata below the s~rface, some of whic~ may be
above and some below the reservoirs which are currently being
produced by the wells and facilities in the MFS 101 account.
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drilling.

When and if Wexpzo achieves a

suc~essful

developmental

well in these reservoirs, it will capitalize that investment in a
special account similar to a rate-base account, and will add to its
service fee billings an amount equal to the base-rate of return (to
compensate for the cost of money)

6

plus eight percent (8%)

(to

compensate for the risk inherent in developmental drilling) on that
investment.

All natural gas produced from developmental drilling

will belong to the utility and be delivered at cost-of-service.
However, because of the risk involved in drilling developmental
wells, and because Wexpro will bear that risk solely and entirely,
the natural gas liquids and any oil which may be produced from a
successful developmental well will not belong to the utility
solely, but will be shared, with the ratepayers getting fifty-four
percent {54%) of the net profits, as described in subsection 2,
infra.

Provisions are made in the Agreement for close monitoring

to assure that all wells which are successful developmental wells
are so declared and provide cost-of-service gas to the utility.
2.

Productive Oil Reservoirs.
The Settlement properties called "Productive Oil

Reservoirs" are essentially those that were the focus of the Court
in the Wexpro Case.

Because ratepayers had borne a large part of

6A floating rate based on returns to a group of unrelated
regulated utiliti~s, initially, sixteen percent (16%).

-14-
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the risk of exploring these properties, it was implicitly assumed by
the parties that these were "utility properties" and that a significant portion of the profits from these properties should be applied
to reduce gas rates.
(a)

This philosophy is implemented as follows:

after expenses and a qase rate of return 7 are

achieved by Wexpro from these properties, the ratepayers
will receive fifty-four percent (54%) of all profits from
the sale of oil and natural gas liquids from these
properties whether produced from existing wells or
developmental wells drilled in the future.
(b)

all natural gas produced from these properties

will be sold by Wexpro to the utility at a cost-of-service
'price specified in the Agreement and approved by the
Commission; (because these are primarily oil-producing
properties to be owned by Wexpro, this cost-of-service
price is contractually guaranteed, as opposed to
Commission-set as with Productive Oil Reservoirs, supra.)
{c)

the profit element in the Agreement's cost-of-

service calcuiations is a base-rate of return of sixteen
percent {16%), 8 which will fluctuate annually {up or
down) based on an index of unrelated regulated companies;

7see note 6, supra.
8This corresponds to the rate of return currently allowed by
the Commission in equity investment.
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(d)

all expenditures for enhancement of oil recovery

and/or development drilling on these properties will be at
the sole risk and expense of Wexpro;
(e)

3.

9

MFS will retain all of the common stock of Wexpro.

Exploratory Properties Held by MFS.
Exploratory properties are unexplored formations underlying

a lease which may or may not already have production from another
formation.

Hence, there are exploratory properties underlying the

MFS 101 account leases (producing gas leases), underlying the MFS

105 account leases (totally unexplored leases), and underlying the
Wexpro oil properties.

The Agreement provides that all leases will

be transferred from MFS's 101 and 105 accounts to Wexpro.

Wexpro or

1

Wexpro's assignee will explore these properties at its sole and

.
. k an d expense. 10
entire
r1s

Anything that is produced in the

9To the extent that development drilling is successful, a
five percent (5%} premium will be allowed in addition to the base
rate of return on investment in successful wells to compensate for
the risk of developmental drilling.
Further, in the event the
total profitability of Wexpro sinks below a certain minimal level,
a two-point incentive rate of return may also be collected by
Wexpro on new investment in enhanced recovery procedures.
lOThe Settlement does not attempt to resolve the issue of
whether Wexpro is a utility.
The Division and Committee note,
however, that the requirement for fair market value consideration
for the transferred properties is inconsistent.to its being a
utility inasmuch as transfers between utilities of property must
always be at book value so as to avoid an inflated rate base
burdening ratepayers.
Further, with Wexpro bearing all the risk
and expense of exploration, it is in a classic non-utility
posture. City of El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm., 362
S • W• 2 d 6 8 0 ( A·r • 19 6 2 ) .

-16-
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future from these unexplored formations, whether oil, natural gas
liquids, natural gas, or other minerals, will be sold and the
ratepayers will receive seven percent (7%) of the gross revenues
from any such production or the utility may take its seven percent
11
(7%) royalty in kind.
Further, MFS will have the first right to
purchase at market for its ratepayers any natural gas which is
discovered in the future on any of these exploratory properties,
thus assuring, to some degree, future supplies of natural gas to
Utah ratepayers.

The seven percent (7%) royalty assures that gas

from these properties will always come net to the ratepayer at below
ll

market prices.
4.

Exploratory Properties Never Held by MFS.
1

There are some properties dealt with by the Settlement

which have never been held in an MFS utility account.

Some of these

properties are producing properties which were never capitalized into
the rate base.

There are also unexplored.properties which Wexpro

acquired directly into its accounts after January,
~

Acquired Properties").

1~77

("After-

The Agreement provides that the utility

obtains no interest of any kind either in producing properties
1,

n

llProvisions are made in the Agreement to assure that, in
the event Wexpro needs to use farm-out or other joint venture
arrangements to adequately explore these prope~ties, the utility's
royalty interest will be preserved or improved, contrary to the
bald and baseless assertion by the Appellants that room for
mischief exists.
{Admin. Serv. Br. at 54)

-17-
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acquired directly into a non-utility account, or in exploratory
properties acquired directly into Wexpro after 1977, with two very
valuable exceptions:
(a}

On approximately one hundred twenty-eight thousand

(128,000) acres of unexplored property acquired by Wexpro after 1977
but before May 10, 1979, the utility is granted a two and one-half
percent (2.5%) gross royalty, similar in operation to the seven
percent (7%) royalty described in subsection C-3, above.
(b)

On certain acreage in the San Juan County; Utah, area

known as the "Bug Field," the utility is also given a two and
one-half percent (2.5%) gross royalty even though this acreage was
acquired after May 10, 1979, or was acquired through farm-in
arrangements where Wexpro bore the entire risk of exploration.
From all the acreage affected by the exceptions, MFS has a first
right to purchase all natural gas, which, by virtue of the royalty,
will always come net to the utility at below-market prices.
5.

Other Consideration.
The Agreement gives the ratepayers Twenty-One Million

Dollars ($21,000,000.00) to reduce rates in the first year of the
Settlement in addition to the proceeds of the various properties.
Also, each year for twelve

(12) years, the ratepayers get an

additional Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00) rate
reduction.

-18-
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E.

BENEFITS OF THE SETTLEMENT
Any attempt to quantify the benefits which flow to the

ratepayers by reason of the Settlement must of necessity be based on
assumptions concerning rates of production, future market price of
gas and oil and levels of success in deyelopmental and exploratory
drilling.

Consequently, the following estimates are very gross

attempts to quantify the benefits accruing to the ratepayer as the
result of the Settlement.
1.

m

Cost-of-Service Gas is Preserved.
The Agreement assures that the Utah ratepayer will continue

u to receive cost-of-service gas from the existing productive oil and
gas reservoirs.

Witness Roseman, a nationally respected expert (Tr.

f

1009-14f, testified that the preservation of this cost-of-service
gas was the greatest single benefit of the Agreement.
lt1

. .
12 th e
By protecting this gas from the FERC ' s NGPA pr icing,

1

.

5,

(Tr. 1017-19.)

12The Agreement was carefully drafted with an eye to the
pending MFS applications before the FERC. Protection of low-cost
gas against the imposition of significantly higher NGPA prices by
the FERC in the Agreement and Stipulation was a hard-won and
important concession to the ratepayer.

The Agreement intentionally provides that the utility will
retain ownership of all the currently producing gas properties.
(Agreement at III-5.) The statutory and case law is clear that
without a sale to MFS there can be no federal jurisdiction of this
transaction under the Natural Gas Act. United Gas Pipeline Co. v.
Mccombs, 442 u.s. 529, 531 (1979). FPC v. Trans-continental
Pipeline co., 365 u.s. 1, 8, 23-24 (1961); Wessely Energy Corp. v.
Arkla Gas co., 5Q3 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1979)'"
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ratepayers are benefited nearly Two Billion Dollars ($2,000,000,000)
over the next twenty
2.

(20)

years.

(Exhibit S-2)

Ratepayers Will Get the Majority Share of Net Oil Benefits.
The Agreement provides an immediate flow to the ratepayer

of fifty-four (54%) of the net profits from the oil properties.
Wi tnes_s Roseman, an important participant in the Settlement
negotiations and a nationally prominent consultant on natural gas

12continued: Gas produced on the currently productive
properties transferred to Wexpro will belong to Wexpro, but it is
all dedicated to MFS at cost-of-service. The Agreement
contractually guarantees both the price (Commission-approved
cost-of-service) and supply (all to MFS) of this gas.
(Agreement at
II-5.)
If FERC exercises jurisdiction over this gas, the contract
price (cost-of-service) will be applied and the MFS parties will
fully cooperate with the Division and the Committee to obtain this
end.
(Stipulation at 15.5.) See United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobile
Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338 (1956); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
F. C • C . , 6 6 5 F. 2 d 13 0 0 , 13 0 3 ( D. C • Ci r • 19 81 ) ; Mi s s is s i pp i Va 11 ey Gas
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 659 F.2d 488, 498 (5th
Cir. 1981).
Pursuant to the Stipulation (15.1), MFS has amended its FERC
Applications to reflect the Settlement and has withdrawn the request·
for FERC jurisdiction over most of the subject properties. If this
Court strikes down the Agreement, MFS would undoubtedly return its
FERC Applications to their prior, highly dangerous state, which
would be its legal right.
Before December 1981, the Division and the Committee had a
"backstop" position at FERC: high NGPA pricing had not been allowed
by FERC to similar gas. In FERC Orders 57 and 98 (issued in 1980),
FERC declined to treat sales of a jurisdictional company's own gas
to itself, even from a subsidiary, as "first sales" under the NGPA,
thus maintaining cost-of-service prices. In December 1981, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down these Orders and required
FERC to apply NGPA pricing to intracorporate transfers of gas.
Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Com'n., 664 F.2d 530,
538 (5th cir. 1981). The Agreement thus remains the only sure means
by which cost-of-service pricing can be preserved for the customers
of MFS.
-20-
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regulation, indicated that the Division and Committee were well
justified in accepting less than one hundred percent (100%) of the
profits from the oil in light of the equities and the other terms of
the Agreement.

In fact, the fifty-four percent (54%) figure

actually achieved was better than what
his mind as an appropriate figure.

~oseman

(Tr. 1024.)

had established in
This i tern could

yield over Two Hundred Fifty Million Dollars ($250,000,000.00) to
the ratepayers over twenty (20) years based on 1981 results.
3.

Vigorous Exploration Is Provided.
The Agreement has mechanisms whereby the benefits to the

consumer are combined with incentives to Wexpro to encourage

t• vigorous development of existing oil and gas reservoirs and to
:t

explorat'ion for additional reservoirs.

l!
ili

In contrast to the hiatus

in exploratory a~d developmental drilling that existed before the

, ,,
11

i Settlement, the Agreement provides a framework of incentives for
m
vigorous exploration and development of oil, natural gas and natural
gas

liquids.

(Tr. 1024A, 1514-15.)

The record shows that by

1

:ui11

~ ~esigning the consideration for the exploratory properties on an
ti

overriding royalty basis, the "lure of the big strike" will be an
incentive to the vigorous and energetic exploration of these
- properties which would not exist were the product to be priced at
!ij)1

1ai

cost-of-service.

(Tr. 1143, 1149-52, 1226, 1397.)

This is an

l~~I

important step in assuring future supplies of gas for Utah

iid
ratepayers. {Tr. 1273.)

-21-
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4.

Ratepayers Are Given a Stake in Future Success on
Exploratory Acreage, but Bear No Risk of Future Failure.
The entire risk of failure on the exploratory properties

will be borne by MFS shareholders.

This is a complete redirection

from the past whereby MFS was allowed tq expense exploratory risk
through its rates.

The result of the former program was often

near-market "cost-of-service" gas and no share of the oil.

Under

the Agreement, the shareholders bear the total risk and the
ratepayers get below-market gas through a seven percent (7%)
royalty.

This royalty comes "off the top"

(Tr. 1523) and, because

of the high cost of today's exploration, it is by no means a fact
that the seven percent (7%) gross royalty will provide less benefits
to the ratepayer than would cost-of-service gas from these
properties, with the ratepayers bearing the expenses and risk of
exploration.

(Tr. 1057, 1231, 1455.)

13

Assuming the success

13witness Roseman considered the seven percent (7%) roY.alty
not only "reasonable" but "fairly high" and indeed a "generous
slice."
{Tr. 1026.) ~oreover, the first right to purchase
natural gas from the exploratory properties, which would belong to
the utility under the Agreement, is a very valuable benefit. As
witness Kirsch indicated:
At the present time there is enough gas being produced in this
area to meet demand by additional connections which are
continually being added to MFS's system and additional supply
will be more difficult to acquire.
Three {3) years ago there
was a shortage of gas and the right to call upon production at
market price was of great value. When in a world where all
energy is in ~hort supply, this call on gas is of significant
importance.
(Tr. 15 24. )
-22-
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level on new exploration on this property that was historically
experienced by MFS, ratepayers could obtain another Two Hundred
Million Dollars ($200,000,000.00) in benefits over twenty years.

In

addition, the elimination of exploratory costs from MFS retail gas
rates will save the ratepayers at least an additional $3 million
dollars annually.
5.

Rates Are Further Reduced by a Variety of Other
Settlement Provisions.
The reduction of rates by the various elements of the

Settlement are multiple and continuingo

The removal of all leases

from the MFS rate-base accounts yields immediate rate
ili approximately $2 million annually.

reduct~ons

of

During the first twelve (12)

months of the Agreement's operation, Twenty-One Million Dollars
($21,000,000.00) in rate reductions will immediately flow through to
reduce rates, and the continuing Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollar
($250,000.00) annual cash payment will further reduce rates.

Thus,

in sum, the Agreement sets the groundwork for continued low-cost gas·
for the MFS customers.
6.

Litigation is Ended.
There is no justification for litigation unless an

h important principle needs to be vindicated or a sure economic

benefit awaits the winner.

In this case, the principle (juris-

r

:tdiction) was won in this Court in the original Wexpro decision, but
t

the ultimate financial benefit to the ratepayers was in limbo.
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Barring settlement, any financial benefit of the Wexpro Case would
be postponed for many years pending the outcome of interminable
litigation.

In 1980, the parties found themselves in a position

where politically and economically, in the absence of compromise,
the only solution was increasingly vigorous litigation in every
forum availableo

The estimates by counsel as to the costs of this

litigation since 1977 yielded a frightening figure in excess of Four
Million Dollars ($4,000,000.00) which the ratepayer in Utah has paid
through both taxes and MFS rates.

However, even this Four Million

Dollar ($4,000,000.00) figure is deceptively small.

Because of the

increased tempo of litigation and inflation, fully one-third of that
figure was incurred during 1981 alone.

The projection of future

costs of' litigation from this point forward, should the settlement
not be affirmed, conservatively reaches an additional Seven Million
Dollars ($7,000,000.00).
rat hole.

This would be money down the proverbial

The record is clear that after five (5) to seven (7) more

years of litigation, if and when the ultimate consumer position
eventually triumphed in all the administrative agencies and all
courts, what was left of cost-of-service gas, the oil profits and
unexplored properties might not be enough to justify what had been
expended in the litigation.

-24-
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II.

la

A.

ARGUMENT

ON REMAND FROM THIS COURT, THE PARTIES WERE NOT PRECLUDED FROM
SETTLING THE ISSUES COVERED IN THE STIPULATON AND AGREEMENT
1.

The Commission Is Statutorily Empowered to Approve
Settlements of any Case Before It.
The statutory powers of the Commission were significantly

roijt

~aii

expanded in 1981 with the amendment of

§

54-7-10 (1), u.c.A. as

follows:

10~

1

At any time before or during a hearing or
proceeding before the Commission, the parties
between themselves or with the Commission or any
Commissioner, may engage in settlement
conferences and negotiations. The Commission may
at its sole discretion adopt any settlement
proposal of the parties and enter an order based
upon such proposal if it deems such action proper.

~ It is apparent from the clear language of the statute that the
~ Legislature intended for the Commission to be able to act as it did

~ in this case to avoid wasteful and disruptive litigation. 14

~
~

14settlements are encouraged and supported by reviewing
courts in the energy regulatory context, even when not all parties
agree with the settlement. Penn. Gas & Water Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d
12 4 2 {D• c . c i r • 19 7 2 ) ; c i ties of Lexington , et a 1. v • E • P . C • , 2 9 5
F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1961). The Coalition attempts to dismiss the
statute by saying the Commission could not approve a settlement
contrary to law, citing Gorgoza, Inc. v. State Road Comm'n, 553
P.2d 413 (Utah 1976). Neither the case nor the Coalition's logic
apply. First, Gorgoza dealt with an agreement withou~ s~ecific
statutory authority. second, while we agree the Comrn1ss1on may
not approve unlawful terms regardless of the power to app~ove .
settlements in g~neral, the terms of the Agreement and St1pulat1on
are lawful, as amply shown in Section B, infra.
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2.

This Court's Wexpro Decision Did Not -- Indeed Cannot
-- Bind the Commission's Regulatory Discretion -- Nor
Did It Preclude Settlement.

Both the Coalition and Administrative Services attempt to
cast the Wexpro Case as a twin to United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662

(1964), and thereby entice this Court to

reverse to assert its reviewing authority.

The El Paso case has no

relevance to this appeal.
That both El Paso and the Wexpro Case ordered remands is
the sole point of congruity.

In El Paso, the order was directed to

a lower court and explicitly ordered total divestiture.

The lower

court in El Paso, bound by the Supreme Court's detailed directive,
/

had no remaining discretion.

Naturally, when subsequent appeals

showed that total divestiture was not accomplished, the Supreme
Court reversed.

Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas

Co., 386 U.S. 129 {1967); and then Utah Pub. Serv. Comrn's v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 394 U.S. 1009 (1969).
This Court's holding in the Wexpro Case declared
jurisdictional law, but directed no specific plan or result.

The

Commission was to factually determine whether properties were
"utility" or "non-utility" and thereafter to use its expertise and
discretion to deal with these properties and their benefits.

As a

remand to an administrative agency, the Wexpro decision could
properly declare legal principles to be utilized in determining

-26-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which properties were utility properties but could not bind the
commission's discretion to formulate an appropriate regulatory
treatment to be accorded such properties.
As a body rich with the expertise to regulate the natural
gas utilities of this State, the Commission received a remand which
t~

was thus properly restrained.

M

court on the one

~and

The law regarding the role of the

(to establish the law) and the role of the

Commission (to regulate the industry) is clear and settled.

An

administrative agency is entrusted by statute with specified
t~

regulatory authority.

On review, this Court determines the law,

but once the Court has declared the law, the Commission fashions
the relief.

The agency is free, within the declared law, to take a

1

totally new approach to the problem.

NLRB v. Food Store Employees

Union, 417 U.S. 1 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting, 309 U.S. 134 (1940)..

City

of Cleveland v. FPC, 561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and C.& N.W.
Transp. Co. v. U.S., 574 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1978), cases cited by
the Coalition, are not to the COJ"ltrary.
This allocation of responsibilities is clearly provided
for in Utah's statutory scheme of utility regulation.

The

Commission is broadly empowered to "regulate and supervise all of
n~

the business" of a public utility,

§

54-4-1, U.C.A., and to

establish "just and reasonable" rates,

§

54-4-2 U.C.A.

In

contrast, this court's review is limited to determining whether the
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Commission acted constitutionally and within the scope of its
statutory authority.

Section 54-7-16, U.C.A.

Thus, this Court is

without authority to prescribe appropriate rates of return for
regulated utilities or fix prices to be paid by ratepayers for
utility services.
Directly contrary to the allegations of the Appellants
(Admin. Serv. Br. at 42-44, 60), numerous factual, policy and legal
issues were left by this Court for possible decision by the
Commission on remand.

The following is a small list of some of the

issues confronting the Commission for resolution after this Court's
Wexpro decision:
What could Wexpro or Celsius charge for gas supplied
to MFS without violating the "no-profit-to affiliates
rule"?

(595 P.2d at 874)

What would the Commission determine to be the proper
return on investment if it declared the oil properties
to be utility properties?

(595 P.2d at 874)

How much risk capital would the Commission recognize
as having been contributed by MFS shareholders to the
exploration program and how would that impact on the
Commission's division of benefits from the oil and gas
properties?

(595 P.2d at 874, 880)

-28-
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Which specific properties were "utility" properties
within the guidelines of this Court?

were properties

acquired by Wexpro directly from third parties'
"utility" properties?

(595 P.2d at 877)

What consideration would

t~e

Commission recognize as

fair market value for the ratepayers' interest in the
oil properties?

(595 P.2d at 878)

What would be the "appropriate benefit" to the
ratepayers after a fair market value sale of
property?

(Id.)

What split of Joint Exploration Agreement properties
and benefits should occur?

:a

/3.

(595 P.2d at 880)

Judicial Precedent Supports the Commission's Approval
of the Settlement.
Federal courts have developed a uniform approach when

er

examining settlements involving the interest of the public.

While

the United States Supreme Court's principal decision, Protective
Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Tracker Ferri, Inc.
ze

v. Anderson, 390 U.S. fl4

(1968), involved judicial approval of a

compromise in a Chapter X bankruptcy proceeding, the principles
announced there have been applied to various proceedings where
~~!

court approval of settlement litigation tinged with public interest
were involved.
U.S. 79 (1981)

See,~,

(c~vil

Karson v. American Brands, Inc., 450

rights action) : McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee

-29-
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Corp., 565 F. 2d 416 (7th Cir. 1977)

(class action settlement) ;

Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1039 (1973)

(stockholder's derivative action); State of West

Virginia v. Charles Pfizer

&

Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N. Y. 1970),

aff'd 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir 1971)

(class action settlement).

These

principles, and their satisfaction by the Commission below, can be
summarized as follows:
(a) Is the Settlement a Fair and Reasonable Compromise of
the Public's Claim?
The trial court in Pfizer explained that "[w]hether to
approve [a] compromise involves an exercise of discretion."
Supp. at 740.

See also,

§

54-7-10(1) U.C.A.

314 F.

A settlement should

be approved if it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate".

Obviously,

as noted in Pfizer, "these terms are general and cannot be measured
scientifically."

314 F. Supp. at 740.

The Pfizer Appellate Court further explained:
It appears to be well settled that in reviewing
the appropriateness of the settlement approval,
the appellate court should only intervene upon a
clear showing.that the trial court was guilty of
an abuse of discretion.
440 F.2d at 1085.

In Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d at 693, the Second

Circuit explained the discretion involved in making a decision as
to the reasonableness of a settlement:
• • • [I]n any case there is a range of
reasonableness with respect to a settlement - a
range which recognizes the uncertainties of law

-30-
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and fact in any particular case and the concomitant risks and costs necessarily inherent in
taking any litigation to completion - and the
judge will not be reversed if the appellate
court concludes that the settlement lies within
that range.
See also In Re Prudence Co., Inc., 98 F.2d 559, 560 (2d Cir.

1938).
ie

The Commission, utilizing its special expertise and

compet~nce, found the Settlement to be fair and reasonable and in

the public interest.
l!

(Order at Findings of Fact #8 and #10.)

(b) The Court Should Not Try the Controversy in the
Course of Approving the Settlement.
Any virtue which may reside in a settlement is
based on doing away with the effect of such a
decision.
Pfizer,

11

It!~

~14

F. Supp. at 741.

(Citing In Re Riggi Bros. Co., Inc.,

42 F.2d 174, 176 (2nd Cir. 1930)).

• • • [T]he very uncertainties of outcome in
litigation as well as the avoidance of wasteful
litigation and expense, lay behind the Congressional infusion of a power to compromise.
This is
a recognition of the policy of the law generally
to encourage settlement.
This could hardly be
achieved if the test on hearing for approval meant
establishing success or failure to a certainty.
Pfizer , 4 4 o F. 2 d a t 1 O8 5 , 1 O8 6 (emphasis added )

(quoting from

Florida Trailer & Equipment Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th
Cir. 1960)).

The Commission specifically applied this standard, as

shown in its Conclusion of Law #3.
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(c) Does the Judgment of Experienced Counsel Support the
Settlement?
The ability and competence of counsel representing the
parties is of great weight.

Pfizer, 314 F. Supp. at 741.

The

record shows the prevailing view of the participants that competent
and

e~perienced

counsel represented the parties.

The Commission so noted below.

(Tr. 1158, 1232)

(Order at Finding of Fact #12.)

All counsel for MFS, Wexpro, the Shareholders, the Committee and
the Division recommended the Settlement.
(d) The Settlement Should Be the Result of Good Faith
Arm's Length Bargaining.
The Court must also be satisfied that a settlement is the
I

result of "good faith bargaining at arm's length."
Supp. at 741.

Pfizer, 314 F.

In the present case, the tough adversarial nature of

the negotiations leading up to the settlement was noted to be the
most vigorous and difficult in the memory of the participants
(Tr. 1015, 1115, 1179.), giving the Commission that assurance of
the fairness of the Settlement.

(Order at Finding of Fact #7.)

(e) Did Bi-Partisan Support Exist for the Settlement?
In Pfizer, the strong support of most, though not all, of
the parties was persuasive to the trial court in approving the
Settlement, 314 F. Supp. at 743.

In this case, witness after

witness with decades of regulatory experience (Tr. 1009-14,
1095-1100, 1190-92, 1216, 1245-46, 1324-25, 1466-67) testified that

-32-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Settlement was fair, reasonable and adequate.

(Tr. 1030,

1149-51, 1195-96, 1232, 1252, 1279-80, 1330-31, 1397-98, 1385, 96,

There was no credible evidence to the contrary. 15

1525-26.)

The

Division and Committee, the parties charged by law with
representing the interests of the customers of MFS in this State,
along with the management of MFS and Wexpro unanimously and without
qualification supported the Settlement.

It is important to note

the Division and the Committee were the first to challenge the
Wexpro issues in 1976 and successfully fought the 1978 appeal in
the Wexpro Case.

Their support for the Settlement is significant

evidence of its fairness.
B.

THE SETTLEMENT IS LAWFUL, CONFORMING TO THE HOLDING AND
GUIDANCE OF THIS COURT
1.

The Commission's Factual Findings and Conclusions
Supporting the Settlement Are Presumptively Correct.

The only real question raised by the Coalition and
Administrative Services is not did the Settlement and the
Commission's Order comply with this Court's directives - tney did.
Their Complaint goes

t~

the findings of the Commission that fair

market value was received for the properties and that the public
o[

lSsome public witnesses, out of an established ignorance of the
scope and terms of the Settlement, testified against the
Settlement. No expert qualified before the Commission supported
~their position, h6wever.
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and ratepayer interest is served by the Agreement.

(Order, Findings

of Fact #8, #9, #10 and #11.) Those Findings are presumptively
correct 16 and are due great deference in the face of the merely
conclusory attacks by Appellants, who had plenty of opportunity to
present persuasive contrary evidence

be~ow

but did not.

The "straw

mantt of noncompliance with this Court's Opinion is baseless.
2.

The Settlement's Implicit Classification of Properties
Pursuant to the Wexpro Case Criteria Recognized
Commission Jurisdiction and Negated the Requirement
of a Remand Hearing.

By the Settlement, all properties transferred from MFS to
Wexpro under the Agreement were transferred for fair market value

16tt • . • The Findings and Conclusions of the Commission on
questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review
• • • tt
{§ 54-7-16 U.C.A) This Court will not disturb findings of
the Public Service Commission which are supported by competent
evidence.
[I]t is not required that the facts found by the Commission be
conclusively established, nor even that they be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence. If there is in the record
competent evidence from which a reasonable mind could believe
or conclude that a certain fact existed, a finding of such fact
finds justification in the evidence, and this Court cannot
disturb it.
PBI Freght Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 598 P.2d
1352, 1355 (Utah 1979). See, also, Empire Electric Association,
Inc. v. Public Service CommissTOn;" 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979} ; Utah
Parks Co. v. Kent Frost Canyonland Tours, 19 Utah 2d 252, 430~d
171 (1967); Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18
Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967); Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d
255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966); Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.2d 590 (1962).
-34-
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~!t

nd a ft er a Co mm i s s. ion finding that the transfer was in the pub 1 i c
interest.

595 P.2d at 878.

The submission of the Agreement to the

Commission tacitly recognized the Commission's jurisdiction over
the transfer.
~

#1 and #3.)

(Stipulation at

§

1.25; Order at Conclusions of Law

Thus, the hearing mandated by this Court's Order of

Remand, to determine whether the properties were utility properties
~

would have served no useful purpose, since the parties effectively
conceded for purposes of the Settlement that all of the transferred
properties were utility properties.
Ratepayers Now Share in the Profits from the

3.
t~

Oil-Producing Properties.

l!

In the Wexpro Case, this Court recognized that the
ratepayers had borne much of the risk of exploration of the oil
properties and were entitled to share in the profits produced from
these properties.

~

~

The Agreement gives to

. production
.
ratepayers the majority of net profits from the 011
(Agreement,

D!

595 P.2d at 873, 878-79.

§

II.) and the natural gas produced from ·oil-producing

wells is committed to the MFS utility system at cost-of-service.
(Id.)

V!
fa~\

4.

Gas is Provided at as Favorable a Rate as Reasonably
Possible.
This Court recognized a "duty" on the part of MFS to

~"give

to the consumers the most favorable ratecreasonably

an

Jpossible."

595 P.2d at 874.

Nowhere in the Wexpro Case is MFS

~

ia

~
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charged simply to provide the lowest possible rate.

This Court was

careful only to require the "most favorable rate reasonably
possible."

The unanimous expert opinion in this record is that the

Agreement is in the best interest of both the shareholders and the
customers,

(~,

negoti~tions

failure.

Tr. 940, 943, 1017, 1149, 1267, 1480), and the

were tough and frequently threatened to end in

The rate reductions which will be achieved under the

Settlement can logically be said to be the most favorable rates
reasonably possible.
In a colloquy between Chairman Bernard and Witness Ritzma,
the Associate Director of the Utah Geological Survey, the following
exchange occurred:
Mr. Ritzma, you were involved in the last
case, or, the first part of this case. What is
your opinion regarding the order that the
Commission entered into in that case and the
stipulation? Which is more advantageous to the
ratepayer and the general public?
Q.

A. Oh, I think the present stipulation is a much
better solution to the . • • problem. It
provides a vehicle for Wexpro to get back into
active exploration and the -- let's say the
existence of an active exploratory arm of the
public utility here I think is vital to the
interests of the people in the State of Utah so
that they can be provided with -- continue to be
provided with gas at a reasonable rate.
(Com. Cameron:) Well now, did your answer
refer to the order of the Commission and the
overruling of that order by the Supreme Court, or
was it just the order of the Commission prior to
it going to the Supreme Court?
Q.

-36-
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A.

I was comparing the state of affairs prior to
let's say, prior to the proposal that the
Commission made prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court and to the present settlement. The
present settlement is much to be preferred and
provides a solution.
l!

(Tr. 1272-1273.)
5.

No Risk Capital Will be Provided by Ratepayers.
This Court criticized the provision of "risk capital"

by ratepayers.

595 P.2d at 874.

The Agreement resolves this

"problem" by requiring that all development and exploration risk be
borne by shareholders.

(Stipulation

§

1.23; Agreement,

§

II - 8,

~

IV - 5.)

No expense will be allowed in any rate paid by MFS

1l~~

customers which is traceable to exploration or development expense.
Further, no increments to either the MFS rate base or the investment
base of Wexpro are allowed which represent unsuccessful exploration
expenses.

Thus, under the Agreement, the entire risk of explora-

tion is shifted to the shareholders and away from the customers.
6.

"No Profit-to-Affiliates Rule" Is Met.
The charge by Administrative Services and the

Coalition that potential sales of gas from currently unexplored
properties to MFS at market prices, and the retention by Wexpro of
46% of the net profit from oil operations, violate the
"no-profit-to-affiliates rule", and hence the Wexpro decision, 595
P.2d at 875, is without substance.

The only aspect of the prior

arrangement which this Court found violative of the rule was that

-37-
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Wexpro was permitted to charge market prices for gas from
properties for which it paid book value consideration.
875.

515 P.2d at

Necessarily, no such arrangement exists in the Settlement.
While a literal and extreme interpretation of the term

"no-profit-to-affiliates" would require that NO profit, not even
a return on investment, be paid by a utility to an affiliated
company, this reading is not consistent with the authorities on
which the Court relied in discussing the rule in the Wexpro
. .
17
op1n1on.
When applied to purchases of goods or services by
utilities from affiliates, which will not be included in the rate
base but rather in the cost of service, courts use the "no profitto-affil~ates" rule as a regulatory tool to ensure, on a case by

17only in cases dealing with construction of utility plant by a
subsidiary does "no profit" really mean !!2. profit.
In Florida Gas
Transmission Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 362 F.2d 331, 334
(5th Cir. 1966), the Fifth Circuit noted that the "no profit-toaffiliates" rule began in the Federal Power Commission case of
·Alabama Power Co., 1 FPC 25 (1932). There, the FPC refused to
allow a utility to pay a profit to a subsidiary for construction
work which would ultimately be included in Alabama Power's rate
base and upon which cost Alabama Power would earn a rate of return.
It is this rule which this Court applied in Utah Power and
Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 152 P.2d 542 (Utah 1944).
There, certain affiliates known as the "Phoenix Companies" did
construction work for Utah Power & Light Co.
Finding that the
Phoenix Companies were nothing more than a department of UP&L
without independent assets or business purpose, this Court disallowed profits paid to the Phoenix Companies from the UP&L rate base.

-38-
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case basis, that a utility does not use "sweetheart" relationships
with its affiliates to inflate profits to inappropriate levels.
Under the majority rule, an affiliate is allowed to receive a
"reasonable profit" if market forces or a similar independent factor
determines profit.

See Washington Water Power v. Idaho Public

Utilitl, 617 P.2d 1242, 1248-49 (Ida. 1980) and cases collected
there.

The Tenth Circuit in Cities Service Gas Company v. Federal

Power Commission, 424 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969) noted the real
problem:
Intra-company transactions cannot be used to
create an artificial or inflated price to be
charged consumers • • • •
t· 424 F.2d at 416 (Emphasis added)

(cited at 595 P.2d at 874-75)

o

Because Cities Service shareholders had received the total
$21,450,000 in profit realized by the utility on the sale of gas
producing property, additional profit through market price sales of
~

gas back from that property were improper.

However, it should be

noted that in Cities Service cost-of-service pricing which included
an element of profit in the form of return on investment was
permitted.
In the present case, since the Settlement provides
).

consideration directly to the ratepayer (as opposed to the
shareholder) in the form of 7% gross royalty on the production from

l·

unexplored properties at no risk, true market price sale of gas back

- to the utility does not violate the rule.

Similarly, the retention

of 46% of the net profits of oil and liquid gas sales is an
-39-
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appropriate owner's share after paying the ratepayers fair market
value for their interest in the property.
Finally, the participation by the Division and Committee in
the negotiation of the Agreement ipso facto removes the abusive
"sweetheart" characteristics necessary for the application of the
"no-pr_ofi t-to-affiliates" rule.

See, generally, Central Telephone

Co. of Va. v. Va. State Corp. Commission, 252 S.E.2d 575 (Va. 1979).
The terms of the Settlement were negotiated at arm's length (often
an "arm plus a baseball bat" Tr. 1015), and thus the Commission
could properly conclude that the Settlement does not violate the
"no-profit-to-affiliates rule".
7.

Undeveloped Acreage Is Recognized as Utility Acreage.
This Court's Opinion recognized that "the undeveloped

acreage may properly be deemed an asset of the gas plant . • • ".
595 P.2d at 875.

The Agreement assumed that the unexplored acreage

was "utility" property.

This acreage, including the unexplored

portion of producing properties, were transferred for a fair market·
value consideration and (subject to the approval of the Commission)
in accordance with the requirements of this Court.
8.

All Property Transfers Were For Fair Market Value.
(a)

Fair Market Value Requires a Split of That Value

Between Shareholders and Ratepayers.

To assure ratepayers of an

"appropriate benefit" from the transfers of MFS property to Wexpro,

-40-
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this Court indicated, that such transfers be for fair market value.
595 P.2d at 878.
e\

The Agreement achieves this objective.

It is

important here to recognize that neither the shareholders nor
ratepayers own one hundred percent {100%) of the interest in any
utility property.

~
~

The relative interests of the shareholders and

ratepayers in any disposition of property are determined, on a case
by case basis, largely by the doctrine of "gain follows risk."

This

determination of interests was settled and the benefits divided
accordingly by the Settlement.
The "gain follows risk" rule does not dictate that all gain
goes to the ratepayers.

As the D.C. Circuit emphasized in

Democratic Central Committee v. Washington Metro Area Transit
~

Commission, 485 F.2d 786, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
The ratemaking process involves fundamentally
'a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests' • • • • In terms of property value
appreciations, the balance is best struck at the
point at which the interests of both groups
receive maximum accommodation • • • •

~Accord:

Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 78 P.U.R.3d 321, 324

{~ich.

1 ~ 1968), part of oil reve?ues to shareholders as rate of return)

Casco Bay Lines, 11 P.U.R. 4th 172 {Maine 1975) {shareholders
allowed to retain ten percent {10%) of the gross revenue from sale

wof

utility property) ; Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Corporation

~

n

Commission, 620 P.2d 329, 341 (Kan. 1980) (reversed P.S.C. order
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granting all the profit from the sale of a utility asset to the
ratepayers, ordering sharing with shareholders).

Certainly,

nowhere in the Wexpro Case did this Court mandate a fixed formula
for sharing of revenues from the property transfer examined there,
leaving to the Commission the expert
priate benefit" to the ratepayers.
(b)

de~ermination

of "an appro-

595 P.2d at 878.

Production-Based Consideration is Fair Market

Value.

All property transfers made by the Agreement are in return
18
for a percentage of revenues
from actual future oil and gas

production, not for hypothetical and arbitrary dollar values
estimated at the time of transfer.
be

receiv~d

These streams of revenue will

without the ratepayer paying one dime of the expense

or risk bf explorationa
Both Administrative Services and the Coalition assume
that because no dollar "value" for these properties was
established, ipso facto the properties were not purchased for fair
value.

This assertion ignores common sense, industry practice,

·and the voluminous record below.

The value of oil and gas

properties depends upon the size of the hydrocarbon deposits

18such a percentage is either realized in the form of receipt of
product at below market prices (as in cost of service gas) or
directly paid to ratepayer through the 191 Account.
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existing on the properties, how quickly they can be produced, market
prices pertaining to the product less the cost of production and
treatment of the product.
predicted in advance.

None of the elements can accurately be

Even the best statistical tools available for

estimating the values of producing properties yield only highly
speculative results.

(Tr. 1155-56, 1261, 1488, 1490.) 19

This is

axiomatic with respect to unexplored properties, because there is no
~

reliable means of determining the conditions which prevail thousands
of feet below the surface of the land without drilling a well.
Hence, any dollar value appraisal of such properties is necessarily

ill

imprecise and naturally leads to the practice of trading oi~ and gas
properties based on a retained percentage of production rather than
a dollat value appraisal.

(Tr. 1045, 1487-88).

Percentage of

production consideration is a practice recognized by government

~
~,

of

19counsel is aware of one well not involved in the MFS/Wexpro
matter which produced at only a few barrels per day for a year,
yielding a certified estimate of reserves based on that production
rate. In just the last sixty (60) days, through no extra effort by
the operator, the well has begun producing hundreds of barrels per
day, rendering yesterday's expert appraisal worthless. Had a "fair
market" dollar value been used to sell the property before the
unforeseen increase in production, the seller would have been
poorly served. Conversely, counsel is also aware of a field
estimated last year, based on production at that time, to have a
certified reserve figure of 60,000+ barrels of oil. Suddenly
production fell and now an estimate gives only a 13 ,000 barrel
reserve. Any dollar value previously fixed w~uld be challenged for
fraud by the disappointed buyer.
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as well as industry.

A principal goal of the 1978 Amendments to the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43

u.s.c.

§ 1331 et seg.

(1976 ed., Suppl. III), was to assure receipt of fair market value
for potentially oil-rich offshore tracts leased by the Federal
Government.

The Act specifies that the consideration will be in

terms of a retained percentage of production.

Additionally, the

U.S. Supreme Court recently held that the Secretary of the Interior
acted properly in awarding offshore leases in return for percentage
of production consideration.

Watt v. Energy Action Educational

Foundation, 50 U.S.L.W. 4031 (December 1, 1981}.
{c)

The Record Below Supports the Commission's Finding

of Fair Market Value.

The Commission heard from highly qualified

experts bn the economic aspects of the oil and gas industry
including:

Howard Ritzrna, Associate Director of the Utah Geological

Survey; Lyle Hale, former Vice-President of Exploration for Mountain
Fuel and now an independent consulting geologist; Herman Roseman, a
nationally respected expert in natural gas regulation; Ralph Kirsch,
a twenty-year veteran of oil and gas exploration and President of
Wexpro; and James Harmon, a New York investment banker with
extensive familiarity with the oil and gas industry.

All gave their

expert opinion that the consideration transferred to the ratepayers
for their interest in the transferred properties was fair market

-44-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

value.

20

(Tr. 1025, 1029, 1045, 1165, 1173, 1249-51, and 1328.)

This testimony was in the record for over a month while the
Coalition and other parties were given time to gather evidence
against it.

When the hearing reconvened, not one qualified witness

20rn the context of challenging the Commission's finding that fair
market value was passed for the property transfers, the Coalition
argues that because of the massive pending litigation that the
Division, Committee and Commission were bludgeoned into approving an
exchange of properties for less than fair market value
consideration. (Brief at 18-19). This conclusion is difficult to
understand. The Division and the Committee had won at every turn:
the Federal District Court case was dismissed, MFS's FERC
~ applications were stymied by Division action, and based on
preliminary rulings before the Commission, the prospects of a
favorable result by the Division and Committee before the Commission
in the remand hearing were great.
Surely, the pressures on MFS to
settle were just as great as they were on the consumer side.
cil

Witness Harmon, a member of MFS' Board of Directors stated:

:1l1

• • • I mean I can't help but say whoever represented the
State -- and I include the lawyers here and their experts
-- did a phenomenal job on behalf of you all, or the
ratepayer, whoever you want to say.
I don't think -- I
think it was too expensive and I don't think it w~s fair
for the shareholder but I think we should do it. Someone,
if this thing ever gets resolved, did a very good job on
that side.
I ·hope they're on my side some day.
(Tr. 1158).
Witness John O'Leary, former Deputy U.S. Secretary of Energy,

1~!1 agreed:

With regard to the customers, I think that they're very
well served by the agreement.
I marvel at the negotiating
skills of the people who represented them.
(Tr. 1232).
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disputed the prior expert testimony concerning receipt of fair
.
21
mar k et va 1 ue f or t h e proper t ies.
9.

The Settlement is in the Public Interest.

This Court required that any sale of utility property be
both for fair market value and in the public interest.
878.

595 P.2d at

The Commission found the Settlement in the public interest.

(Order at Findings of Fact #8, #9 and #11).

It must be understood

that the public interest is not necessarily equivalent to gas now at
the cheapest price possible.

It is in the public's long-term

interest first to assure future supplies of gas, and second, to get
it at the most favorable price possible.

The only way to assure

future supplies of gas is to provide incentives for energetic and
vigorous exploration and development of potential gas-bearing
properties.

It is also in the public interest to obtain the

immediate flow of Agreement-provided benefits to the consumer to
cushion the inevitable rise in gas prices rather than continuing a

21Richard Rosenburg testified, on behalf of the Coalition,
concerning Pacific Gas & Electric's exploration program. It is
instructive to note that PG&E's utility exploration subsidiary
acquired similar exploratory properties from a shareholder
subsidiary, not for a monetary consideration, but rather for
production-based consideration: alternating a six and one quarter
percent (6.25%) overriding royalty or a percentage of the net
profits.
(This compares with the 7% royalty obtained by the
ratepayers base.) DeGolyer & McNaughton, the respected oil and gas
geology firm, pronounced this fair market value.
(Tr. 1754.)
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8. The Settlement is an agreement between the
parties, and approval thereof by the Commission
does not modify or in any way limit the
jurisdiction of the Commission to require
information from the parties and to investigate
transactions under the Settlement in which the
parties are involved.
9. By adopting and approving the Stipulation,
the Commission does not relinquish or limit any
jurisdiction or statutory authority it possesses.

While the scope of the Commission's statutory jurisdiction was not
H:

affected by the Settlement, properties sold at fair market value out
of the utility (whether a used truck or a gas property) do
individually become unregulated if they.are thereafter used in a
non-utility manner.

This diminution of jurisdiction (if it.can

accurately be characterized as such) is an obvious consequence of
the utility being an operating business and not a museum and is
tacitly recognized by this Court's Wexpro opinion when it indicated
that such transfers could take place for fair market value, 595 P.2d
at 878.
2.

The Division and Committee Have Authority to Execute
and Function Under the Agreement.
No serious question should arise as to the legal capacity

of the Committee either to enter into the Agreement or perform
thereunder.
U.C.A.
~

That is legislatively settled.

§

54-10-1,

et~.,

The question of the author:ty of the Division to act as a

party is judicially settled.

In Utah Department of Business

Regulation, Division of Public Utilities v. Public Service Comrn'n,
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litigatious quest for the "last dime" of benefits, or the absolute
vindication of a litigation position.

The Settlement is in the

public interest because while it recognizes the victory of the
Division and the Committee before this Court in the Wexpro Case on
the issue of the ratepayer having an interest in the oil
properties, it also provides a mechanism to yield continuing
benefits long into the future in the form of assured supplies of
gas committed to the state at prices which will be among the lowest
in the nation.

(Tr. 1018, 1019, 1023, 1030, 1158, 1226, 1232,

1252, 1272, 1273, 1280, 1319-20, 1398, 1485 and 1688).
C.

BY ITS ORDER, THE COMMISSION DID NOT WAIVE OTHERWISE LEGAL
JURISDICTION
1.

/Commission Approval of the Agreement Could Not Result in
the Relinquishing of Any Jurisdiction Over Any Entity.Administrative Services spends a great deal of effort

belaboring the "straw man" that the Commission and the Division
somehow relinquished jurisdiction or abandoned legal ·duties through
the provisions of the Agreement, Stipulation, and Order.
position which is impossible to support.

This is a

First, this Court found

in Wexpro, as a matter of law, that state agencies cannot
relinquish or waive their statutory jurisdiction.
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 151 P.2d 467

See also Utah
---- --(1944).

Second,

the Commission explicitly stated in the Order that it was not
relinquishing its statutory jurisdiction as a matter of law:

-47-
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614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980), this Court clearly interpreted the
Division as "an advocate" represented by the Attorney General, the
independently empowered legal officer of the State.
1252.

614 P.2d at

The Division functioned in good faith reliance on this

Court's recognition of it as a party adyocate, empowered by
54-7-10(1) U.C.A. to negotiate the Settlement subject to Commission
approval.
The only purpose of the Stipulation was to provide a
commonly agreed to legal and factual basis for the Commission's
approval of the Agreement.

The Agreement is nothing more than a

contract for the transfer of properties and money which provides a
self-policing mechanism for internal monitoring and enforcement.

At

i tern 11.'2 of the S_tipula ti on, the Committee and the Di vision agreed

not to argue that the properties transferred to Wexpro under the
Agreement were thereafter subject to utility regulation because the
Division and the Committee believe they are not.
~U!~
l~ i

The Division and

the Committee may at some future time be proven wrong when and if
'the issue is brought before the Commission.

But nowhere in the

Division's or the Committee's statutory mandate is the requirement
no

to take any particular position on an issue.

That is the freedom of

an advocate.
The Division was given the contractual role under the
l1

Agreement to monitor MFS and Wexpro compliance, with the Committee
joining in the enforcement mechanisms.

Because of the statutory
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role of the Division and the technical expertise available to it, it
is eminently suited to monitor compliance with the Agreement.
3.

22

Arbitration Outside of the Decision-Making Body Is
Lawful and Consistent with Public Policy.
Contrary to Administrative

Serv~ces'

charge (Admin. Serv.

Br. at 69), the arbitration clause of the Agreement in no way "does
away with" the Commission's jurisdiction or authority (Br. at 69).
As stated earlier, the Agreement and Stipulation, which are
contracts, were intended by the parties to be self-enforcing once
the Commission found the terms to be just and reasonable.

Thus,

internal monitoring and arbitration remedies were initially
employed.

However, the Agreement affirmatively requires that

enforceme'nt of an arbitration order dealing with utility questions
be by the Commission, with non-utility orders enforceable by a

22 In this regard, Administrative Services again evidences an
inability to understand the Settlement when it states that the
Division is "prohibited" from using experts who have previoqsly
assisted it in the Wexpro matter, for monitoring of MFS and wexpro
performance.
(Br. at 7q). In fact, the Division may use any person
it chooses to assist in monitoring, and has the continuing power to
require MFS and Wexpro to produce information concerning their
activities for Division investigation. (Agreement at VIII-4.) The
only constriction is in regard to special funding provided in the
Agreement, which covers the first several thousand dollars of
expenses for one accountant and one petroleum engineer to
specifically help monitor the Agreement. Only this internal funding
is restricted against those who actively represented the Division
and assisted in negotiating the Agreement. {Stipulation a t , 8.2.)
The Division certainly, as in the past, may hire whomever it wishes
from its own budge~ funds.

-so-
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competent court, such a court being fully able to decline jurisdiction at the request of the Division or Committee if it found itself
faced with a utility question.
An agreement to arbitrate a dispute which arises under a
contract is both valid and favored by the law.
Bread Co., 160 P.2d 421 (Utah 1945)

Latter v. Holsum

(dissent of Wolfe,

J.)

Section

78-31-1, U.C.A. as amended in 1977, expressly authorizes parties to
agree "to submit to arbitration • • • any controversy which may
arise in the future."

By allowing for arbitration, the Legislature

certainly did not constrict the jurisdiction of the courts, nor the
Commission.

Additionally, it should be noted that the Agreement and

Stipulation are only contracts between the parties.

The Commission

is not a' party to or bound by the Agreement or Stipulation, and may
investigate and enforce such orders as it deems appropriate.
§§

D.

54-4-1, 2 U.C.A.
THE CLEAR HOLDING OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDER RENDERS IT FINAL
AND BINDING.
The shareholders purport to be concerned that the

t~~11

Commission's Order does not clearly express the intent that the

t~

Order be a final, res judicata resolution of the issues covered by
the Settlement.

It is difficult to take this concern seriously in

view of paragraph 6 of the Commission's Conclusions of Law:
The Commission's findings and conclus'ions with
regard to the transfer of properties and the
allocation of benefits contemplated by the
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Settlement, including the findings and
conclusions that the transfer of properties and
the allocation of benefits are reasonable and
for market value and are in the public interest,
are intended by the Commission to be final and
not subject to future change (except through an
appropriate and timely petition for rehearing or
judicial review).
The Commission so concludes
because to ensure the proper development of said
properties, the parties must be able to rely on
the finality of the findings and conclusions in
regard to the transfer of properties and
apportionment of benefits. The Commission also
is entitled to rely on the finality of its order.
It is hard to imagine a clearer expression of the intent
that the Order be a final resolution of the issues settled by the
Agreement, Stipulation and Order and have res judicata effect.

In

view of this language, one suspects that the shareholders have
raised the issue only for the purpose of obtaining the added
comfort of this Court's holding that the Order is final and res
judicata.

Certainly, the Division and Committee have no objection

to this Court giving the shareholders such further comfort with
respect to the disposition of the properties, funds
covered by the Agreement.

~nd

benefits

However, portions of the shareholders'

brief seem intended to tempt this Court to go further and to rule
that the Commission has finally resolved issues which the
Commission clearly indicated it did not intend to resolve.

For

example:
1.

Can MFS restructure its business without a determin-

ation of the Commission that it is in the public interest?

(Order

at pp. 8-9).
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2.

Can MFS or its subsidiaries divest the Commission of

jurisdiction to regulate MFS activities through FERC Applications?
(Order at p. 10).
3.

Which activities or subsidiaries of MFS are subject

to Commission regulation?
4.

(Order at p •. 5).

Can the Commission order MFS as a utility to engage

in an oil and gas exploration program involving properties not
covered by the Settlement?

(Order at p. 9).

The Division and Committee do not at this point express
any opinion as to how these issues should be resolved.

The only

purpose in mentioning these issues is to indicate that the
Settlement and Order did not and were not intended to resolve
these issues, and their resolution is not necessary to upholding
the finality and

~

judicata effect of the Order Approving the

Settlement.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the record testimony and the reasons set forth
above, the Commission's Order Approving the Settlement should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 1982.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-53-

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
David L. Wilkinson
and
Craig Rich
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Utah Division of
Public Utilities and Utah
Committee of Consumer Services

-54-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of July, 1982, the
required number of copies of the foregoing Joint Brief were hand
delivered to:
Robert S. Campbell, Esq.
Gregory Monson, Esq.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Edward w. Clyde, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON
77 West Second South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Calvin L. Rampton, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& McDONOUGH
800 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Ray G. Groussman, Esq.
Gary Sackett, Esq.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
180 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139

Donald Holbrook, Esq.
Elizabeth Haslem, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& McDONOUGH
800 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Bruce Plenk, Esq.
Ron Nehring, Esq.
Utah Legal Services
352 South Denver Sgreet
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

The Public Service Commission
600 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

Jay David Gurmankin, Esq.
500 Kearns Building.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-55-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

